# Research Project Proposal: Efficient Solutions for Adversarial Team Games

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- 1. Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory
- 2. Preliminaries
- 3. State of the art
- 4. Project proposal



#### **1.** Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory

- 2. Preliminaries
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"Game theory is the name given to the methodology of using mathematical tools to model and analyze situations of interactive decision making. These are situations involving several decision makers (called players) with different goals, in which the decision of each affects the outcome for all the decision makers."

M. Maschler, E. Solan, S. Zamir. "Game Theory". 2013

and **Computer Science** 

# Algorithmic (Game Theory)

Algorithmic Game Theory is the area at the intersection between Game Theory















































































# Potential Real-World Applications

- Physical Security: Strategic
  organization of the available
  resources
- **Car Races**: Coordination of strategies among team members





# Outline

#### 1. Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory

#### **2.** Preliminaries

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	r	l
R	(6,6)	(0,7)
L	(7,0)	(1,1)







		r	l
0.75	R	(6,6)	(0,7)
0.25	L	(7,0)	(1,1)



	Ρ	Player 1	<b>Player 2</b>
		0.5 r	<b>0.5</b> <i>เ</i>
0.75	R	(6,6)	(0,7)
0.25	L	(7,0)	(1,1)

# Information and recall in games

#### **Perfect vs. imperfect information game**

In some games, defined as *perfect information* games, the state of the game is completely observable by the players



When the state is not completely observable, the game is defined as *imperfect information* game



#### Perfect vs. imperfect recall game

A *perfect recall* game is a game in which no player forgets information that he/she acquired before



An *imperfect recall* game is a game in which there is at least a player that is an imperfect recall player (e.g. it forgets some information that was known before in the game)



• A team is a set of players that share the same objectives in the game



function





• In Game Theory a team is modeled as a set of players that have the same utility

• Solution concept introduced by John Nash in 1951

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- A NE is a joint combination of strategies stable with respect to unilateral deviations of a single player

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- deviations of a single player



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r

that no player can gain more that  $\varepsilon$  by unilaterally deviating

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l

(0,7)(1,1)

Approximation of Nash Equilibrium ( $\epsilon$ -NE): joint combination of strategies such

# Team Maxmin Equilibrium

- Team Maxmin Equilibrium is the NE that maximizes the team utility
- From the team's perspective, a generic NE can be arbitrarily inefficient w.r.t. the TME

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## State of the art

1 vs 1 Games (polynomial complexity)

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N vs 1 Games (NP-hard)

1 vs 1 Games (polynomial complexity)
#### State of the art

N vs 1 Games (NP-hard)

1 vs 1 Games (polynomial complexity) Introduce state-of-the-art algorithms for two-player games

Explain source of NP-hardness of solving team games

Introduce state-of-the-art algorithms for team games

# State of the art: 1 vs. 1 games

Fictitious Play: (Slow convergence rate)

Weakened FP (van der Genugten, 2000)

Fictitious Play (FP) (Brown, 1951)

 $\epsilon \sim O(\frac{1}{\sqrt[n]{T}})$ 

Fictitious Self Play (Heinrich et al., 2015)

Neural FSP (Brown et al., 2018) No-regret learning: (Fast convergence rate)

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2008)

 $\epsilon \sim O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}})$ 

CFR-BR (Johanson et al., 2012)

Monte Carlo CFR

(Lanctot et al., 2009)

Deep-CFR (Brown et al., 2018)



- number of available actions (Basilico et al., 2016)
- Focus on 2 vs 1 games



• From the perspective of a team, not correlating the strategies of the teammates can be inefficient, in a measure depending on the number of players and on the

Two different models of communication between team members, supported by different devices:

Two different models of communication between team members, supported by different devices:

Communication Device:

Two different models of communication between team members, supported by different devices:

Communication Device:

• Preplay and Intraplay communication

Communication Device







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**Correlation Device:** 

- *Preplay* communication
- TMEcor



- TMEcom:
  - Can be computed in polynomial time. (Celli and Gatti, 2017)
  - Requires intraplay and preplay communication (often not feasible)

#### TMEcor:

- NP-hard. (Celli and Gatti, 2017)
- Requires only preplay communication (almost always feasible)



#### Hybrid Column Generation (Celli and Gatti, 2017)



HCG algorithm:

- Two LPs formulated on a progressively larger hybrid formulation of the game
- BR oracle formulated as an ILP
- Approximation can be obtained by relaxing binary constraints of BR oracle
- ILP limits scalability



- Best response as a MILP  $\bullet$
- MILP limits scalability
- Convergence rate of FP  $\bullet$

Converges to TMEcor (equivalence between NE in auxiliary game and TMEcor in original game)

Soft Team Actor-Critic (Celli et al., 2019)



- Model-free (no knowledge of the game-tree required)
- Actor-critic architecture with separate policy and value function networks
- Policies are conditioned on an exogenous signal drawn *ex-ante*
- TMEcor approximation under specific assumptions

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#### Our Goal

Our goal is to develop scalable and efficient algorithm to find equilibria in the context of team games, offering some theoretical guarantees of convergence



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N vs 1 Games

1 vs 1 Games



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• Consider Team as a single player and apply two-players solutions:

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  - Team strategy grows exponentially with the number of teammates, not scalable

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  - Team strategy grows exponentially with the number of teammates, not scalable
  - In games with imperfect information team becomes an imperfect recall player

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#### •Consider Team as a single player and apply two-players solutions:

• Apply model-based solutions:


### •Consider Team as a single player and apply two-players solutions:

- Apply model-based solutions:
  - Limitations in scalability



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### •Consider Team as a single player and apply two-players solutions:

#### •Apply model-based solutions:

• Apply model-free solutions (e.g. STAC):





### •Consider Team as a single player and apply two-players solutions:

#### •Apply model-based solutions:

- Apply model-free solutions (e.g. STAC):
  - No guarantees of convergence





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**Solution:** Use an hybrid approach to gain advantages of different frameworks







### Adapt CFR-BR to the case team vs single opponent:

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AUXILIARY GAME

### Adapt CFR-BR to the case team vs single opponent:



BR

TEAM

AUXILIARY GAME

### Adapt CFR-BR to the case team vs single opponent:

• Approximate BR using Deep Reinforcement Learning



### Advantages of the proposed framework:

- Scalability:
  - Represent compactly the team strategy
  - Use a ML approach to solve a problem that is NP-hard (best response)
- Maintain theoretical guarantees proper of CFR

# Applications

- Recreational games:
  - Goofspiel
  - Contract bridge
- Real-world:
  - Security
  - Car races











Questions?

Thank You For Your Attention!