

# Research Project Proposal: A Non-Cooperative approach in Configurable Markov Decision Processes

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CSE Track



**POLITECNICO**  
MILANO 1863



**HP-SR**  
in Information Technology

# A Non-Cooperative approach in Configurable Markov Decision Processes



Prof. Marcello Restelli



Alberto Metelli



Giorgia Ramponi



Alessandro Concetti

# Outline

- Preliminaries
- Motivation
- State of the art
- Research plan


30-35 minutes

# Preliminaries

- Reinforcement Learning
- Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)
- Configurable Markov Decision Processes (Conf-MDPs)



# Reinforcement learning (RL)



# Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)

Formally an MDP is a tuple  $(S, A, P, R, \gamma, \mu)$ , where:

- $S$  is the set of states
- $A$  is the set of actions
- $P(s' | s, a)$  is the transition model, i.e. the probability distribution over the next state, starting from state  $s$  and performing action  $a$
- $R(s, a)$  is the immediate reward, given the current state  $s$  and the performed action  $a$
- $\gamma$  is the discount factor
- $\mu(s)$  is the probability distribution over the initial state

Let's define a **policy** as a probability distribution  $\pi(a|s)$  over  $A$  given the current state  $s$ .

# Goal


The goal is to **find the optimal policy**, i.e the policy that maximizes the expected future reward.

$$J^\pi = E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R(s_t) \mid \pi\right]$$



# Environmental parameters

In many real-world problems, there is the possibility to configure some environmental parameters.






# Configurable Markov Decision Processes (Conf-MDPs)

Formally a Conf-MDP is a tuple  $(S, A, R, \gamma, \mu, \mathcal{P}, \Pi)$ , where:


- $(S, A, R, \gamma, \mu)$  is the classical MDP without the transition model  $P$
- $\mathcal{P}$  is the set of transition models
- $\Pi$  the set of policies

*The goal is to find the optimal model-policy pair  $(P, \pi) \in \mathcal{P} \times \Pi$ .*

# Configurable Markov Decision Processes (Conf-MDPs)




What if the supervisor and the agent were no longer cooperative?






# Non-cooperative scenario




# Non-cooperative scenario








# Non-cooperative scenario



# Outline

- Preliminaries
- **Motivation**
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# Successes of non-cooperative models in Machine Learning






# Real-world applications of Non-Cooperative Conf-MDPs



Supermarket

# Real-world applications of Non-Cooperative Conf-MDPs



E-commerce



# Real-world applications of Non-Cooperative Conf-MDPs




Design of road networks



# Outline

- Preliminaries
- Motivation
- **State of the art**
- Research plan

# State of the art



# Conf-MDP

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## Configurable Markov Decision Processes

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Alberto Maria Metelli<sup>1\*</sup> Mirco Mutti<sup>1\*</sup> Marcello Restelli<sup>1</sup>

I

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## Reinforcement Learning in Configurable Continuous Environments

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Alberto Maria Metelli<sup>1</sup> Emanuele Ghelfi<sup>1</sup> Marcello Restelli<sup>1</sup>

II

## Policy Space Identification in Configurable Environments

**Alberto Maria Metelli, Guglielmo Manneschi, Marcello Restelli**  
Dipartimento di Elettronica, Informazione e Bioingegneria  
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albertomaria.metelli@polimi.it, guglielmo.manneschi@mail.polimi.it, marcello.restelli@polimi.it

III

# Conf-MDP (I)

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**Configurable Markov Decision Processes**

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Alberto Maria Metelli<sup>1\*</sup> Mirco Mutti<sup>1\*</sup> Marcello Restelli<sup>1</sup>

(Jun 2018)

- Theoretical formalization of the novel framework
- Safe Model-Policy Iteration (SMPI)
- Applicable in **finite** and **completely known** environments



# Conf-MDP (II)

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Reinforcement Learning in Configurable Continuous Environments

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Alberto Maria Metelli<sup>1</sup> Emanuele Ghelfi<sup>1</sup> Marcello Restelli<sup>1</sup>

(Jun 2019)

- New learning algorithm: *Relative Entropy Model-Policy Search* (REMPS)
- Two phases:
  - Optimization
  - Projection
- Applicable to **unknown** and **continuous** environments

# Conf-MDP (III)

## Policy Space Identification in Configurable Environments

**Alberto Maria Metelli, Guglielmo Manneschi, Marcello Restelli**

Dipartimento di Elettronica, Informazione e Bioingegneria

Politecnico di Milano


Piazza Leonardo da Vinci, 32, 20133, Milano, Italy

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(Sep 2019)

- The Conf-MDP is used to simplify the identification of the policy of an agent.
- Configuring the environment is useful to distinguish useless parameters from non-controllable ones.

# State of the art





# Multi-Agent Learning (MAL)



~~MDP~~



Stochastic Games






# Learning in Multiagent environments

- Finding the optimal policy is not as obvious as the single agent case
- Coalition formation
- Partially observable environments
- Non-stationary environments


# MAL in Conf-MDP




# MAL in Conf-MDP

The **configurator** models the agent's behavior recovering its reward function

- More difficult if it has partial information




# MAL in Conf-MDP



- The **agent** could follow possible strategies:
  1. Ignore environmental changes
  2. Forget previous configurations




# MAL in Conf-MDP




- The **agent** could follow possible strategies:
  1. Ignore environmental changes
  2. Forget previous configurations
  3. Awareness of the configurator

# MAL in Conf-MDP




- The **agent** could follow possible strategies:
  1. Ignore environmental changes
  2. Forget previous configurations
  3. Awareness of the configurator
  4. Possible coalition formation

# State of the art





# Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL)



*The goal of IRL is to recover the unknown reward function from the expert's demonstrations.*

# Why should we use IRL?

- When we want to know what are the reasons that induce the agent to choose some behaviors
- When the reward function is hard to design



# Example of IRL

- A set of expert demonstrations  $D$  is given.
- **Goal:** find  $R(s,a)$  that is equivalent, in term of performance, to the *unknown* reward function  $R_E(s,a)$  of the expert
  - This means that we want similar state-action visitation frequency:  $\mu_E \approx \mu$ 
    - Evaluate  $\mu_E$  from  $D$
    - Initialize randomly the reward  $R$
    - Repeat until convergence
      - ◆ Find the current policy  $\pi$  induced by  $R$  with RL techniques
      - ◆ Evaluate  $\mu$  of the current policy  $\pi$
      - ◆ Update  $R$  based on the comparison between  $\mu$  and  $\mu_E$

# Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL)

IRL is an **ill-posed** problem


- maximize the entropy
- maximize the margin between the optimal policy and the others

Two categories:


- Model-based
- Model-free
  - Interactive model-free
  - Batch model-free



# IRL in Conf-MDP



# State of the art




# Game Theory (GT)

*Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction among rational decision-makers.*



**Stackelberg Games**

# Stackelberg Games





# Stackelberg equilibrium

The leader (player 1) and the follower (player 2) aim to solve these optimization problems:

$$\min_{x_1 \in X_1} \left\{ f_1(x_1, x_2) \mid x_2 \in \arg \min_{y \in X_2} f_2(x_1, y) \right\}$$

$$\min_{x_2 \in X_2} f_2(x_1, x_2)$$

A strategy  $x_1^*$  is called a **Stackelberg equilibrium strategy** for the leader if

$$\sup_{x_2 \in \mathcal{R}(x_1^*)} f_1(x_1^*, x_2) \leq \sup_{x_2 \in \mathcal{R}(x_1)} f_1(x_1, x_2), \quad \forall x_1 \in X_1,$$

where  $\mathcal{R}(x_1) = \{y \in X_2 \mid f_2(x_1, y) \leq f_2(x_1, x_2), \forall x_2 \in X_2\}$  is the rational reaction set of  $x_2$ .

# Stackelberg Games

## Convergence of Learning Dynamics in Stackelberg Games

**Tanner Fiez**

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*Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering  
University of Washington*

**Benjamin Chasnov**

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*Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering  
University of Washington*


**Lillian J. Ratliff**

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*Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering  
University of Washington*

- Investigate the relationship between Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
- Provide a learning rule for the leader that provably converges to a Stackelberg equilibrium

# Stackelberg Games in Conf-MDP




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


# Non-cooperative Conf-MDP




# Possible assumptions

IRL process




- The configurator is omniscient
- The configurator has partial information

Agent's awareness



- The agent is unaware
- The agent is aware


Possible multiple agents



- Single agent
- Multiple agents


# Possible assumptions

IRL process




- **The configurator is omniscient**
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Agent's awareness




- **The agent is unaware**
- **The agent is aware**

Multiple agents



- **Single agent**
- Multiple agents

# Project plan





Thank you for your attention!

Alessandro Concetti